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FOREWORD
Few countries are as important to U.S. national security as
Mexico. Yet, surprisingly little has been written about the
complex of issues that make up the U.S.-Mexican national security
matrix. In part, this is because we have long taken our southern
neighbor for granted. Today, however, this is no longer possible.
Mexico is the birthplace of a rapidly growing segment of U.S.
society. The North American Free Trade Association has
accelerated its interdependence with the U.S. economy. At the
same time, Mexico has been experiencing great political,
economic, and social disruption, and has become the territory of
origin or transit of most of the illegal drugs entering the
United States. The growing interpenetration and interdependence
of the two countries means that this turmoil is more likely than
ever to spill over the border. Whether in the form of economic
interaction, illegal immigration, or the spread of corruption and
violence, what happens in Mexico increasingly affects our own
national interests. By redefining U.S.-Mexican national security
in nontraditional terms, Dr. Donald E. Schulz has gone a long
way towards helping us comprehend the implications of what has
been happening. Equally important, he offers practical
suggestions as to how U.S. leaders should respond--and not
respond--to these challenges.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
report as a contribution to understanding events in this critical
North American neighbor.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This study analyses the changing nature of U.S.-Mexican
national security issues, with a focus on narcotrafficking, the
growing militarization of Mexico's counterdrug and police
institutions, the danger of spreading guerrilla war, and the
prospects of political and economic instability. The conclusion
is that Mexico is in the midst of an extended period of
transition in which it is extremely vulnerable to disruption on
several different fronts simultaneously. While the economy has
largely recovered from the 1994-95 peso crisis, it remains both
fragile and volatile. Although much progress has been achieved in
democratization, there is still a long way to go. Both political
and criminal violence are growing. A new guerrilla group has
appeared which may prove to be more troublesome than the
Zapatistas. At the same time, the drug cartels are increasingly
targeting law enforcement officers for assassination.
In response to this growing lawlessness, the Mexican
government has turned to the military for support in the
struggles against narcotrafficking, insurgency, and common crime.
Law enforcement is being increasingly militarized. While the
immediate benefits of the strategy make it tempting, the costs
and risks are considerable, especially as they relate to the
growing vulnerability of the armed forces to corruption, the
increased likelihood of human rights violations, and the
potential for undermining Mexican democracy. Unless a major longterm effort is made to foster police and judicial reform,
militarization may turn out to be a semipermanent feature of the
emerging new political system.
Within this context, the author argues that the United
States should provide, and encourage other governments to
provide, Mexico with the assistance it needs to strengthen
civilian institutions and gradually reverse the militarization
process. Meanwhile, care should be taken to make sure that U.S.
counternarcotics aid is used for the purposes intended. When
human rights violations, electoral fraud, or other abuses occur,
the United States should forcefully exert its influence, but
primarily through private diplomacy rather than public
demonstrations like the annual certification ritual. Indeed, the
author suggests that certification has become counterproductive
and should be abolished.
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BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE:
THE UNITED STATES, MEXICO,
AND THE AGONY OF NATIONAL SECURITY
A politician who is poor is a poor politician.
Carlos Hank Gonzalez
Cabinet member during the Salinas Administration1
Since I was 17, I have been in military schools where
they have hammered us with values such as honesty,
discipline, and loyalty to the fatherland. These values
make us more resistant to corruption [than civilians].
General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo
Director, National Institute to Combat Drugs
(December 1996-February 1997)2
Over the past several years, a major shift has occurred in
the panorama of U.S.-Mexican national security concerns. In the
process, Mexico, a country that had enjoyed extraordinary
political and socio-economic stability for most of the preceding
half-century, has become dangerously unstable. Yet, few of the
sources of this instability can be traced to traditional national
security threats. While there was a time when one could view
national security in narrow military terms, that era has now
passed, both for Mexico and the United States.3 The question is
whether nonmilitary solutions can be found for these problems, or
whether, failing that, a strategy of militarization will be
adopted, and, if so, with what consequences.
The Scourge of Narcopolitics.
Arguably, the most serious threat to Mexican national
security today is narcotrafficking.4 The reason is not hard to
discern: The cartels have so penetrated the Mexican state and
socio-economic structure that they have effectively subverted the
country's institutions. You name the institution, and it has to
one extent or another been corrupted: Congress, the courts, state
governors, banks, businesses, the military, the police. The
Federal Judicial Police have been so corrupted that it is no
longer possible to make clear-cut distinctions between them and
the criminals they are supposed to apprehend. In Mexico, the
police very often are the crooks, and they have been deeply
involved in narcotrafficking.5 Even the presidency has been
touched, at least indirectly. There have been cabinet members who
have had connections with the cartels. A former member of
President Zedillo's and ex-President Salinas' security detail has
admitted having been an operative for the Tijuana Cartel.
Salinas' brother, Raul, almost certainly had ties with the Gulf
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of Mexico Cartel, and possibly with the Tijuana Cartel as well.6
In short, we are not simply talking about a comparative
handful of crooked politicians or gangsters. Drugs are the
country's major export crop. In 1994, Mexico earned at least $7
billion and perhaps as much as $30 billion from narcotics.7 The
same year, the largest legal export--oil--earned only $7 billion,
and all legal exports combined amounted to less than $61 billion.
And while much of this money is invested abroad, much also is
returned to Mexico where it is recycled into businesses, both
legitimate and illegitimate. By investing in privatized state
companies, ports, tourism, construction, hotels, restaurants,
exchange houses, banks, and innumerable other enterprises,
Mexico's narcos "are able to both launder their profits and
masquerade as respectable entrepreneurs."8
Mexico has become hooked on drug money. And that raises an
important question: Given the extent of its addiction, can it
stand a withdrawal? If the Zedillo administration were to succeed
in eliminating--or, more realistically, sharply reducing--drug
trafficking, what would be the impact on the economy? Mexico is
currently in the process of recovering from a deep recession; the
economy is still very fragile. Can the government take the chance
of disrupting the recovery by really going after the drug lords?
And if it did, what would be the social and political
implications (the impact on unemployment and social unrest, for
instance)? It is significant that U.S. officials have been very
hesitant to slap stringent economic sanctions on the traffickers-in no small part out of fear of the damage that could be done to
the Mexican economy.9
The pain of withdrawal would be considerable in another way
as well. For some time now, Mexicans have been debating whether
or not a process of "Colombianization" was underway in their
country. By Colombianization, of course, I am referring to a
state of all-out war between the government and the cartels,
similar to that which occurred in Colombia in the early 1990s,
when the government went after (and eventually got) Pablo Escobar
and the Medellin Cartel. So far, that has not happened in Mexico.
It has not happened because the government has not waged war
against the cartels the way the Colombian government did, and so
there has been no massive retaliation or massive bloodshed.
There have, however, been some troubling recent
developments. For some time, the United States has been pressing
Mexico to take a stronger stand against the cartels, and
President Zedillo has accordingly agreed to do this.10 In early
1996, the government arrested the head of the Gulf of Mexico
Cartel, Juan Garcia Abrego, and turned him over to U.S.
authorities. Not long thereafter, it began going after the
Arellano Felix brothers in Tijuana. An aggressive federal
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commander, Ernesto Ibarra Santes, was appointed head of a special
mobile intelligence unit, which swept through the area
confiscating properties and arresting associates of the Tijuana
Cartel. In August, as part of a nationwide purge of the Federal
Judicial Police, about a quarter of the Federales in Baja
California were dismissed. Ibarra was appointed commander of the
federal police there. One month later, he received a call from
then Attorney General Antonio Lozano, ordering him to report to
Mexico City. When he arrived, no security detail was there to
escort him so he left the airport in a cab. A few minutes later,
a car pulled alongside, and gunmen sprayed the taxi with
automatic weapons fire, killing Ibarra, two bodyguards, and the
driver.11
This was not an isolated assassination. During this period,
eight counternarcotics officials or former officials based in
Tijuana were killed in a little over a year, along with more than
a dozen state and municipal police and scores of minor
traffickers. Altogether, in the year ending in October 1996 some
200 Mexican officers were killed in drug-related violence.12
One does not have to be a rocket scientist to figure out
what has been happening. There is a cause and effect
relationship. If you go after the cartels, they will come after
you. And I will go even farther than that: If you go after the
corrupt police who are linked to the cartels, they will retaliate
also. The fact that the assassins knew the details of Ibarra's
travel plans suggests they were acting on inside information.13
Beyond this, there is another problem. Since coming to
office, the Zedillo administration has made a serious attempt to
revamp the police. In 1996 alone, some 1,200 police officials
were dismissed. Over the past couple of years, the Federal
Judicial Police (PJF) have been purged and over a third of the
force fired.14 Meanwhile, the military has been increasingly
brought into the law enforcement business. In late 1995, the
armed forces took over the top command of the Federales in
Chihuahua, bringing in active duty and former officers in a "test
case" for a pilot project to incorporate personnel with military
training into the PJF.15 Since then, generals have been placed in
command positions in at least 19 state civilian police agencies
and the federal district.16 Ninety-five federal police and drug
enforcement agents in Baja California have recently been replaced
by soldiers. Over 100 military personnel have been incorporated
into the federal attorney general's office in Chihuahua, and
others are performing similar functions in Tamaulipas. In Nuevo
Leon, the entire contingent of 50 PJF agents has been replaced by
twice as many soldiers. Increasingly, mid-level local commanders
are meeting with police and judicial officials to formulate
public security strategies.17
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In December 1996, moreover, generals were placed in charge
of the Federal Judicial Police, the National Institute to Combat
Drugs (INCD, the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration), and the Center for the Planning of Drug Control
(CENDRO).18 Reportedly, the mid-level officers and the operational
command units that will support them will also come from the
armed forces.19 At the same time, the Center for National Security
and Investigation (CISEN), the government's secret information
service, has increasingly been taken over by the military.20
Furthermore, since June 1996 there has been a sweeping shake-up
of the police in Mexico City. The new head of that force, retired
Brigadier General Enrique Salgado Cordero, has brought in nearly
200 military officers to oversee the department. Some 2,600
police are to be replaced by soldiers charged with patrolling the
streets and combating crime. In the Federal District and
elsewhere, troops have been repeatedly used to locate and help
apprehend drug traffickers. In Tijuana, military officers have
been placed in charge of the federal prosecutor's local office
and the special police border unit monitoring immigration; the
director of the state police is a military man, as is the chief
of security at the city's international airport. As a result of
these and other measures, some 70 percent of the narcotics
confiscated in Mexico in 1996 was found by the armed forces.21
All of this, of course, is being done for a reason: Not only
are the cartels more powerful than ever, but violent crime has
been skyrocketing. There were some 1,500 kidnappings in Mexico in
1995, more than in any other Latin American country except
Colombia (which leads the world in that dubious honor). Last
year, about 30 percent of Mexico's commercial establishments were
held up. Some of this, at least, is attributable to the police or
former police, who are putting their skills to use in new and
creative ways. (By 1995, according to an internal Mexican
Interior Ministry report, there were some 900 armed criminal
gangs in Mexico, over half of which were composed of current or
former law enforcement officials.)22
Now, much of this crime is due to other factors also. The
socio-economic crisis that began in December 1994 has driven a
lot of people over the line, and they are doing whatever they
have to do to survive. A lot of it is illegal, and some of it is
violent. At the same time, drug traffickers and guerrillas have
increased their involvement in the kidnapping business. The point
is simply that efforts to cure the diseases of drug trafficking
and corruption will be painful. Indeed, in the short run they may
be as painful as the diseases themselves, which is one reason why
the government has been so reluctant to push the matter. Again,
the danger is that a dialectic of violence may occur, which could
potentially take Mexico down the road to full-scale
"Colombianization." If that happened, even the president of the
republic would not be safe.
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Why is all this of interest to the United States? The
answer is fairly obvious. In recent years, some 50-70 percent of
the cocaine, up to 80 percent of the marijuana, and 20-30 percent
of the heroin imported into the United States has come from or
through Mexico.23 And add to this a newcomer: methamphetamines.
"Speed" is enjoying a dramatic surge in popularity in the United
States. Indeed, it is not too much to suggest that a major shift
is occurring in the international drug trade. Over the next
decade, there is likely to be a marked decline in U.S.
consumption of cocaine. Tastes are changing, and synthetic drugs
will at least partially push it out of the market. And here the
Mexicans--especially the Guadalajara cartel run by the brothers
Jesus and Luis Amezcua--have gotten in on the ground floor. They
control about 80 percent of the U.S. market for methamphetamines,
operate labs and distribution systems deep inside the United
States, and have a vast network of foreign suppliers that
stretches around the world.24 Finally, Mexico has become one the
most important money laundering centers in the Americas.
Drugs are a national security issue for the United States.
Indeed, they may well be the most important U.S. national
security interest in this hemisphere. They are poisoning our
society, destroying the social fabric, and spreading crime,
violence, and death. Mexican drug organizations already operate
deep inside the United States, and there is mounting evidence of
their corrupting effect on U.S. federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies all along the Rio Grande. Should drug
violence in Mexico escalate, we will not be immune. It will
spread over the border. Indeed, it already has.
This again raises the issue of the cure and the disease. I
have already asked whether Mexico can stand the pain of a
withdrawal from its addiction. The question might equally be
posed of the United States. Given the impact that a major drug
war would have on the Mexican economy and its potential for
social and political destabilization, including an increase in
illegal migration across the border, can the United States really
afford such a policy? I do not pretend to have the answer. I
would merely suggest that this is an issue that needs to be fully
thought out.
The Spread of Guerrilla Violence.
Another major national security issue that needs to be
addressed is the spread of guerrilla war. Some time ago, this
writer raised the issue of whether there were other groups
besides the Zapatistas (EZLN) that might pose a national security
threat to Mexico. In particular, I mentioned a group calling
itself the Clandestine Revolutionary Workers Party-Union of the
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People-Party of the Poor, or PROCUP-PDLP. And I further stated
that if another guerrilla war did break out, it would most likely
begin in Guerrero.25 Since then, of course, a new insurgency has
flared up, initially in Guerrero but quickly spreading to Oaxaca
and several other states. A new rebel organization, the
Revolutionary People's Army (EPR), has appeared, composed of 14
tiny leftist factions, including PROCUP-PDLP.
Very little is known about the EPR, but what is known is
disturbing. These are, in the words of one scholar, the "cavemen
of the left."26 The movement's patriarch appears to be Felipe
Martinez Soriano, a former rector at the Oaxaca Benito Juarez
Autonomous University, who has been imprisoned since 1990 for his
involvement in the killing of two La Jornada security guards in
Mexico City. Over the years, Martinez Soriano and PROCUP-PDLP
(which was founded in 1979, but whose roots go back to 1964 and
the small revolutionary cells that flourished during that decade)
have gained a reputation for fanaticism and violence that makes
the Zapatistas look like choirboys. Until recently, at least, the
rebels were unabashedly Marxist-Leninist and Maoist and advocated
a strategy of Prolonged Popular War. Other groups in the radical
left tended to view them as "crazies." They have been known to
execute their own people for "ideological deviations" and wage
war against other, less extreme, leftist organizations.27
How much popular support the group has is hard to say. My
guess is not very much. However, it is certainly well-financed.
The insurgents appear to get much of their money from
kidnappings, bank robberies, and possibly drug trafficking. The
Mexican government believes they were responsible for the
kidnapping of billionaire Alfredo Harp Helu in 1994, for which
they are reported to have received $30 million.28 They are wellarmed and give the impression of being highly organized and
disciplined (as one would expect of groups which have led an
underground existence for over two decades).29 They have some
ability to launch coordinated military attacks, and are not
geographically limited to any one region of the country. They can
pop up from safe houses in Mexico City as well as the povertystricken rural areas of southern Mexico. This gives them a
considerable ability to appear and disappear at will, which means
they can fight at times and places of their own choosing.
All this makes the EPR hard to defend against and even
harder to wipe out. Thus, one can expect continued sporadic
guerrilla attacks, bombings, kidnappings, and other acts of
terrorism. Does the group have the capacity to win widespread
popular support? Probably not. Its very extremism works against
its acquiring a mass following. This being said, however, it
clearly does have some backing. It would be impossible for it to
operate in and around the Federal District without some social
base. In January 1996, moreover, a nationwide coalition of scores
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of leftist groups was formed, including radical peasant and
teachers unions. This movement, which calls itself the Broad
Front for the Construction of a National Liberation Movement
(FAC-MLN), provides considerable networking potential for the
guerrillas. The EPR has shown some signs of moderating its
tactics and rhetoric in order to broaden its appeal through a
campaign of "armed propaganda."30 Part of this apparently
included a decision not to try to disrupt the July 1997
elections. Recently, however, the EPR has resumed its attacks,
claiming that the government was pursuing a torture campaign
against it.31
Beyond this, there is a lot of discontent in the
countryside. Agrarian unrest has mounted in recent years and will
probably continue to increase, in large part because of the
government's own actions: Its agricultural modernization program-including the revision of Article 27 of the Constitution (in
effect ending the agrarian reform), the NAFTA, the elimination of
quotas, tariffs, subsidies, credits and so on--will add fuel to
what are still scattered bonfires. For their part, the
Zapatistas, though contained militarily, have provided
inspiration for tens of thousands of peasants, some of whom have
already begun to seize lands for themselves. Some of the new
guerrilla groups--and there are other small organizations out
there besides the EPR and the EZLN32--are clearly trying to
emulate the better known movements. Whether these fires will grow
larger and spread, how far and how fast, is impossible to say,
but it would be foolish to pretend there is no problem. (An
additional complicating factor lies in the potential linkages
between some of these groups and the drug cartels. There has been
speculation that the EPR could be getting some of its arms and
funding from narcotraffickers. While there is no hard evidence of
this to date, one cannot dismiss the possibility that some of
these groups might develop into narcoguerrilla organizations a la
Colombia.)
Along these same lines, if guerrilla violence does spread,
it will probably be partially because the Mexican military and
police mishandle their counterinsurgency responsibilities. There
is a danger that these forces will engage in large-scale human
rights abuses or encourage local vigilante groups in such
activities (indeed, there has already been some of this),33 and
that this will have the effect of pushing significant numbers of
campesinos into the arms of the guerrillas. This is a classic
syndrome. One could see it very clearly in the formative years of
the Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrilla movements in the late
1970s/early 1980s,34 and there is a chance it could occur in
Mexico, too. President Zedillo, for one, is aware of the trap and
has promised not to fall into it,35 but whether he can control the
military, the police, and various violence-prone local forces
remains to be seen.
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The Socio-economic Crisis.
Another major national security issue that must be at least
briefly mentioned is the socio-economic situation. Nineteen
ninety-five was a year of crisis: 30,000 businesses went
bankrupt, at least a million people (and probably many more) were
thrown out of work, interest rates soared to 140 percent,
inflation hit 52 percent, the economy contracted by 6.6 percent,
and the value of the peso shrank to about 12.8 cents.36 More
recently, however, things have been looking up. The country is no
longer in a recession. Indeed, the growth rate during the last
three-quarters of 1996 was nothing short of explosive. Investors
are once again rushing to lend money, with the result that in
January 1997 President Zedillo was able to announce that Mexico
had paid back all of the $12.5 billion loan it had borrowed from
the United States with interest, 3 years ahead of schedule. All
in all, the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean estimates that the economy increased by about 4.5
percent in 1996, and most observers expect comparable growth this
year.37
This may well happen, but a note of caution is advisable.
During the past two decades, Mexico has experienced a series of
economic crises (1976, 1982-83, 1986-88, and December 1994-early
1996), and it is premature to conclude that it has broken out of
this syndrome. Not all of the current indicators are positive,
and some are even illusory. The Mexican recovery, after all, has
in substantial part been the product of external forces--in
particular, the international bailout which sent a forceful
message to investors that the United States and the international
financial community would not let the country go down the drain.
In the short run, the sharp devaluation of the peso has enabled
Mexico to turn around its balance of payments deficit. Imports
and exports are now roughly in balance. The question is whether
they will stay that way as the economic recovery strengthens the
country's capacity to import foreign products. If they do not,
then there could very well be trouble down the road.
By the same token, the early repayment of the U.S. loan was
less an indication of a sustainable economic recovery than of
simple good business sense. All the Zedillo administration really
did was borrow money on the European bond market at lower rates
and send it to the U.S. Treasury. At the same time, the recovery
has been largely restricted to the export sector. The domestic
economy, which employs more than 80 percent of the job-holding
population, remains generally stagnant.38 Similarly, growth has
yet to spread from the industrialized north to the rural south.
Even if it eventually does--and it may not--the recovery there is
likely to lag far behind that in the more prosperous north. Thus,
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potentially explosive regional economic disparities will continue
to grow.
If I had to sum up the Mexican economy in two words, they
would be "fragility" and "volatility." In recent years, the
economy has resembled a rollercoaster, rising and falling for
reasons that are sometimes very superficial or ephemeral. The
December 1994 peso crisis, for instance, was sparked by a
Zapatista "offensive" that turned out to be nothing more than
guerrilla theater.39 Moreover, there are factors at work that are
beyond Mexican control. Had the Clinton administration decided to
decertify Mexico with respect to the war on drugs, the impact on
the economy might well have been traumatic.40 Similarly, if U.S.
interest rates should rise sharply, investors will be tempted to
place their money in Miami or New York rather than Mexico.41 And
should the United States sink into a recession, the impact would
be substantial. (Among other things, it would affect the U.S.
capacity to import Mexican goods.) This is part of the dark side-rarely discussed--of the growing interdependence of the two
economies.
The Mexican stock market and peso still have not completely
stabilized. There were some shaky weeks last autumn (1996),42 and
this February the peso, buffeted by uncertainty as to whether
President Clinton would recertify Mexico, suffered its largest 1day drop in over a year, falling to 8-to-the-dollar. (It is
currently at 7.9 to the dollar.) Some economic analysts believe
that the government will have to devalue again after the July
1997 elections. This issue scares a lot of people who remember
what happened in 1994. These analysts have argued that Zedillo
should have dealt with the problem earlier, but did not for
political reasons.43 The administration faces a tough election and
has not been willing to do anything (like substantially lowering
the value of the peso) that would hurt its chances. That raises
the question of whether history is about to repeat itself.
President Salinas, it will be recalled, also postponed dealing
with an overvalued peso before the August 1994 elections, only to
have the economy collapse a few months later.
Will that happen again? Probably not. The best guess is that
if there is an economic downturn, it will not be the kind of
cataclysmic disaster it was last time. Some of the key variables
are different: Under the structural reforms instituted after the
last crisis, the Central Bank has adopted a "free-float"
strategy, with the value of the peso largely being determined by
the markets.44 By the same token, Mexico today is not facing an
imminent balance of payments crisis, with major short-term loans
coming due and no money to pay them. On the other hand, the value
of the peso has not depreciated in accordance with continuing
high rates of inflation (about 27 percent in 1996), and that may
indeed mean that the currency has become overvalued. Some
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analysts predict it will slip to between 8.5 and 9 pesos to the
dollar by the end of the year.45 Furthermore, Mexico still owes
billions to the International Monetary Fund and is expected to
borrow more this year.46 The total foreign debt, incidently, is
now over $180 billion, which is a higher percentage of the
economy than in 1982 when Mexico's inability to meet its payments
triggered the Latin American debt crisis.47
Besides these economic variables, of course, there is
growing narcoterrorism and a new guerrilla group to worry about-not to mention the increasing uncertainty surrounding the
country's electoral future. Investors don't like instability and
unpredictability. If the political crisis worsens--if there is an
upsurge in assassinations, guerrilla violence, and political
turmoil (if, for instance, elements opposed to the current
economic reforms come to power)--it may well have an impact on
the health of the economy. Everything is connected to everything
else. A continuing political crisis would make a sustained
economic recovery more difficult, and, if the recovery cannot be
sustained, that, in turn, will prolong the political turmoil.
The Continuing Political Crisis.
Will there be more political instability, scandals, and
violence? In a word, yes. Not only is there a growing threat of
narcoterrorism and guerrilla attacks, but the political power
struggle within the governing Partido Revolucionario
Institutional (PRI) has not yet been resolved, and some of these
elements can be very violent. After all, there is a lot of power
and money at stake. At the same time, the struggle between the
PRI and the opposition is only going to intensify. Moves by the
former to circumscribe electoral reforms were probably a
harbinger of things to come.
In November 1996, after nearly 2 years of negotiations with
the opposition which produced over a dozen agreements, the PRI
broke off talks and used its legislative majority to impose its
own more limited measures. Among other things, the ruling party
will retain a marked advantage in state funding, there will be a
higher ceiling on private contributions to campaign funds,
spending violations will be decriminalized, and there will be
restrictions on the opposition's ability to unite behind "common"
candidates.48 The motive behind these manuevers is not difficult
to discern: Strong showings by the opposition in state elections
in Guerrero, Coahuila, and Mexico had raised fears that the PRI
might lose its majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997.
Equally worrisome, polls showed the PRI far behind in the
critically important race for mayor of the Federal District
(Mexico City).49 A way had to be found to stack the deck.
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All this, it may be noted, comes at a time when the
"dinosaurs"--the old-line bosses who largely lost control of the
party in the 1980s and early 1990s--are staging a comeback. A
fierce power struggle is underway. At the PRI's 17th National
Assembly in September, the Old Guard succeeded in pushing through
rules that would require the party's next presidential nominee to
have held elective office and been a party member for at least 10
years. Such a requirement would have prevented the last 5
presidents of Mexico from holding that office. The PRI deputies'
subsequent decision to, in effect, throw out Zedillo's electoral
law proposal and replace it with one of their own was only the
most recent sign that the politicos are in the process of
wresting back control of the party from Zedillo and the tecnicos.
If they are successful, this will pose a major obstacle to
political and economic reforms.
Things could get nasty. Electoral fraud and political
violence are very real possibilities. Already, the PRI government
has moved to suppress the activities and influence of foreign
monitors and domestic critics. In January, the European Union was
obliged to rescind a $420,000 donation to a local human rights
group to monitor the July federal and state elections. In the
weeks that followed, the Mexico City offices of the National
Action Party (PAN) and the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD)
were broken into and computer records stolen. Following
disastrous election losses in the state of Morelos, the pressure
was intensified. Pro-government legislators introduced a bill
outlawing foreign financial support for independent electoral
observers;50 several foreign human rights activists were expelled
from the country; and a prominent political commentator was fired
from a weekly radio show after he criticized President Zedillo.51
Meanwhile, armed local supporters of the PRI, sometimes assisted
by the police, continued to wage low-intensity war against
government opponents in the countryside.52
As of May, it is not possible to confidently predict the
outcome of elections for six governorships and the Chamber of
Deputies. The polls suggest a wide-open battle. (The Senate is
another matter. Only a third of the seats are up for election;
the PRI will retain control.) The most recent surveys, however,
indicate that the PRD's Cuauhtemoc Cardenas has a substantial
lead in the race for mayor of the Federal District.53 In the
Chamber of Deputies, in contrast, the PRI will probably come away
with a plurality of the seats and could very well win a majority.
(It could win an absolute majority with as little as 42 percent
of the vote.54) For his part, President Zedillo has abandoned all
pretense of impartiality and is actively campaigning for his
party.55 Surveys indicate that his popularity has risen sharply as
the economy has improved, and that people are beginning to feel
somewhat better about the economic situation.56 This will probably
improve the PRI's chances somewhat.
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In sum, while the opposition will undoubtedly make major
gains, in the short run, the PRI seems likely to weather the
storm. The opposition is deeply divided between the conservative
PAN and the center-left PRD, and the PRI should be able to
exploit that. Even if it loses its majority in the Chamber of
Deputies, it will probably continue to govern in an uneasy tacit
alliance with the PAN. On the other hand, the new congress will
certainly be more independent than its predecessor, since even
many PRI candidates are critical of the Zedillo administration
and its policies. This could make for considerable unruliness and
unpredictability. Rather than imposing its will on the deputies,
the administration will have to negotiate with them, and this may
not always be easy.57
Meanwhile, at the local level the PAN and the PRD will
continue to encounter major resistance in traditional bastions of
PRI power, where caciques (political bosses) will sometimes rule
in open defiance of Zedillo's attempts at democratization. Rather
than a slow, steady spread of democracy, therefore, a more
mottled pattern is likely, with opposition and reform elements
holding sway in some areas, and PRI "dinosaurs" retaining control
in others.
And so the political struggle will continue. The next "big"
election will be in 2000, when the presidency itself will be at
stake. By then, one suspects, the PAN may have a more formidable
candidate than it has ever had before. I believe Vicente Fox,
the charismatic governor of Guanajuato, will run.58 Moreover, if
Cardenas becomes mayor of the Federal District as expected, he
will undoubtedly use that position--the second most powerful
political post in the country--as a counterpoint to Zedillo's
presidency and a launching pad for his own presidential candidacy
in 2000. Thus, it is entirely possible that the opposition will
have two formidable candidates in that race.
The PRI, of course, is highly skilled in the art of divide
and conquer. Even so, the most critical factor in the next
presidential campaign will likely be the state of the economy. If
it is in good shape, the PRI candidate will probably win. If it
is not, however, the party will be in even deeper trouble than it
is today. If Vicente Fox or another opposition candidate were to
win, that would again raise the issue of whether the PRI is
willing to turn over power. In the past, it has sometimes
resorted to massive fraud to salvage victories that could not be
won by legitimate means. If election 2000 turned out to be a
repeat of 1988, there could be serious violence.59
But 2000 is a long way off. Anything can happen in 3 years.
Mexico is heading into uncharted waters, and about the only thing
that can be said with confidence is that there will be more
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turmoil. The glue that for so many decades held together the
numerous fiefdoms constituting the Mexican political elite has
disintegrated, leaving these factions locked in a fierce struggle
for power and spoils. The presidency, long a key to holding
together the ruling coalition, has lost much of its legitimacy
and ability to mediate conflicts and impose solutions. At the
same time, the growing strength of the opposition both within and
outside the PRI raises the possibility of political immobilism
and instability. While the worst-case scenario--ungovernability-seems unlikely, at minimum one should expect more scandals and
violence. All this will make for continuing Mexican national
insecurity.
The United States and the Revolution in Mexican Military Affairs:
Pitfalls and Prospects.60
The past 2 years have witnessed major changes in the U.S.Mexican military relationship. Granted, things have not always
gone smoothly. The Mexicans have long memories. They have never
forgotten that a good part of the U.S. southwest was once Mexican
territory, and that the United States has intervened on other
occasions as well. As a result of these experiences and the
enormous imbalances in military, economic and political power
between the two countries, Mexicans developed a deep sense of
insecurity vis-a-vis the "Colossus of the North." They have
traditionally been wary of getting too close for fear of losing
their sovereignty or becoming an economic vassal. Until the
1980s, their military manuals portrayed the United States as
Mexico's natural enemy, and there is still a National Museum of
Invasions in Mexico City where children can learn about the sad
history of their country's relations with the gringos. And while
the decision to join the United States and Canada in the North
American Free Trade Agreement has broken down many of these
inhibitions, there continues to be a lingering sensitivity in the
Mexican psyche.
All this contributed to the furor in the Mexican press in
March 1996 when it was learned that U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Perry had told reporters that the two countries were
considering conducting combined military exercises. Mexican
officials fell over one another rushing to assure the public that
U.S. soldiers would not be allowed to engage in maneuvers on
Mexican soil. Yet, Perry had never suggested sending troops to
Mexico. He was talking about combined naval exercises, and had
simply listed this as one among a number of programs that could
be undertaken to build goodwill. But though the Mexicans had
overreacted, the damage was done. Mexico halted scheduled
combined naval operations with the United States. In spite of a
large increase in drug shipments off the Pacific Coast, those
exercises have still not been conducted.61
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Notwithstanding that episode, however, U.S.-Mexican
relations have been changing fast. In October 1995, Perry made
the first ever official visit to Mexico by a U.S. Secretary of
Defense, and the following April his Mexican counterpart, General
Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, returned the honor. On the latter
occasion, the two men signed an agreement for the transfer of 20
UH1H "Huey" helicopters to the Mexican Air Force, with up to 53
others to be delivered in 1997. In addition, the accord provided
for the training of Mexican soldiers in counternarcotics tactics,
as well as the training of helicopter pilots and mechanics, at
various American military bases.62 This was the largest agreement
of its kind ever concluded between the two countries. Previously,
helicopters had been provided to the Mexican antinarcotics police
rather than to the armed forces. In October 1996, it was reported
that altogether 73 copters and four surveillance planes, worth
$50 million, would be donated.63
Meanwhile, Mexico City and Washington were engaged in
increasingly wide-ranging talks on combined counter-narcotics
operations. In March 1996, Presidents Clinton and Zedillo
established a High Level Contact Group on Drug Control to address
the threat drugs posed to both countries. Later that month, at
the first meeting, a 10-point communique was issued, calling for
the development of a joint antinarcotics strategy and increased
cooperation, along with the implementation of laws to criminalize
the laundering of drug profits. Since then, other meetings of the
Contact Group have been held, and the Mexican Congress has
enacted money-laundering and organized crime laws to facilitate
the war against trafficking.64
Keep in mind that these developments have been occurring at
a time when the Mexican military has been assuming new policing
functions, including drug interdiction, and when it is
increasingly involved in counterinsurgency operations in over a
half-dozen states. Half the Army has been mobilized for the
struggle against the EPR and the Zapatistas; in the process,
vast areas of central and southern Mexico have been militarized.
Furthermore, it is a time when the armed forces are rapidly
growing in manpower, arms, budget, and political influence. Since
1994, troop strength has increased by some 15 percent to about
180,000, and will reportedly reach 210,000 by early next century.
In 1995 alone, military spending may have increased by as much as
44 percent, and it has continued to rise ever since. (Even this
does not tell the whole story, however. Off-budget bonuses
controlled by the president may add up to a billion dollars more
to the armed forces' coffers.) Over the past 3 years, the
military has purchased 70 combat helicopters, 70 AMX-13 tanks, 14
training aircraft, and more than a thousand armored vehicles.65 At
the same time, President Zedillo has continued his predecessor's
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practice of including the Ministers of Defense and Navy in a
National Security Cabinet, along with the Ministers of Justice,
Interior and Foreign Affairs.66
In short, the Zedillo administration has made the generals
an offer they cannot resist. They cannot say no. Some, indeed,
are plunging into their new jobs with great enthusiasm, sensing
no doubt a golden opportunity for themselves as well as their
institution.
So the military is out of the barracks. Its roles and
missions are expanding, and it is becoming much more involved in
the policy process. Yet, not surprisingly, all this is making
some observers uneasy. Moreover, some of the people who are most
uncomfortable are in the armed forces. Military leaders have
always been reluctant to become too deeply involved in
counternarcotics operations for fear that this will make the
institution more susceptible to corruption. While the services
have long been involved in crop eradication, policing and
interdiction are more dangerous activities. The military has
traditionally been very protective of its prestige. In general,
it has enjoyed a much better image than other governmental and
political institutions, and it does not want to lose that public
support--which could very well happen if it is increasingly
penetrated by the narcotraffickers.
And make no mistake about it, such penetration will occur.
The notion that the military is somehow invulnerable to drug
corruption is a myth. The case of General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo
(to be discussed presently) provides only the most recent
evidence. Until February, when he was arrested for being on the
payroll of Amado Carrillo Fuentes' Juarez Cartel, Gutierrez
headed the National Institute for the Control of Drugs. A few
years ago, another general was relieved of his command after
being accused of protecting Colombian drug flights. In yet
another incident, in 1991, two generals and three other officers
were detained and imprisoned after soldiers refueling a cocaineladen airplane shot and killed seven narcotics agents who had
been trying to capture the craft. Since the arrest of Gutierrez,
moreover, several other generals have been accused of
collaborating with the Juarez and Tijuana cartels.67
In short, if the military has been less susceptible to
narco-penetration than the police, it is in part because it has
constituted less of a threat to the cartels. That, however, is
changing fast, and one must expect that the narcos will step up
their efforts to subvert the institution. Most military officers
are poorly paid, and this leaves them vulnerable to bribery.
According to one U.S. estimate, Mexican traffickers spend as much
as 60 percent of their estimated $10 billion in annual profits to
suborn government officials at all levels.68 Military and law
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enforcement agencies simply cannot compete with this.
Then, too, there are other sources of reluctance. Some
officers worry that getting more deeply involved in policing and
counternarcotics will adversely affect the military's ability to
perform its traditional missions. In addition, many dislike this
kind of work. They are not trained for it and tend to look down
on it. Still others are concerned that these new duties will
embroil them in violence they would rather avoid. Even so, it is
difficult to say no when your budget and troop strength are
growing, and you are being given all sorts of new toys to play
with.
Another concern, particularly within the human rights
community, is that as the military becomes increasingly involved
in police, counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations,
human rights violations will increase. Again, there is a myth
that the Mexican military is different from other Latin American
militaries--that it is somehow immune from the abuses that have
characterized other armed forces in the region. While it is true
that the Mexicans have not engaged in the kinds of massive
violations committed by their colleagues in Guatemala, El
Salvador, Colombia, Peru, and elsewhere, their record is far from
impeccable. Serious abuses, including executions, were committed
during the fighting in Chiapas, for which no one so far has been
prosecuted. Allegations of human rights violations have risen
again in recent months, especially in Guerrero and Oaxaca, where
the military has launched operations against the EPR guerrillas,
and Chiapas, where the army, police, and paramilitary groups have
stepped up the pressure on the Zapatistas.69 In the wake of the
Gutierrez Rebollo affair, moreover, evidence has arisen of
military involvement in kidnappings and disappearances related to
the war against drugs.70
Counterinsurgency and human rights issues will be an ongoing
concern for the United States and could potentially become a
source of embarrassment and friction. The Clinton administration
and Congress have provided the Mexican Government with $37
million in military aid in 1997, and some of this is reportedly
being used against the Zapatistas and the EPR.71 Moreover, what
would happen if U.S. military equipment donated for
counternarcotics purposes were diverted to fighting guerrillas?
Or if U.S. arms were used to suppress legitimate political
movements? There would likely be a hue and cry in both
countries.72
Beyond the issue of counterinsurgency, moreover, the growing
involvement of the military in the public security realm cannot
but lead to apprehension that the armed forces, like the police,
will engage in excessive violence. Indeed, a certain amount of
this is probably inevitable. Soldiers are human beings; they make
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mistakes. Some are prone to violence by temperament or
conditioning, and such tendencies can easily come out in tensionridden, dangerous circumstances. At the same time, military
personnel receive a different kind of training and come from a
very different professional culture than police. The latter tend
to be more sensitive to community concerns (since they often live
there) and are conditioned to meet threats with the minimum
amount of force necessary to control the situation. In contrast,
soldiers are warriors. As the saying goes, they are trained to
kill people and break things. They are normally isolated from the
community, and may be more prone to viewing it as occupied
territory than a neighborhood.
One should not overstate these differences. The Mexican
police tend to be a predatory bunch. The real question is how
much military violence will occur, and whether there will be
mechanisms of accountability sufficient to preserve justice and
prevent abuses from getting out of hand. To date, the evidence is
not encouraging. The military continues to be unresponsive to
human rights charges. (Since 1993, General Jose Francisco
Gallardo Rodriguez has been imprisoned for the "crime" of having
proposed the appointment of an ombudsman to root out military
corruption and human rights violations.)73 There is also a concern
that the weakening of due process protection that has occurred as
part of the Zedillo administration's efforts to combat organized
crime may result in the military being drawn into political
conflicts and used to suppress the government's opponents.74
In short, there is a danger that the United States might be
increasingly drawn, wittingly or otherwise, into Mexico's
domestic affairs, even to the point of taking sides--or being
perceived to take sides--in the country's evolving political
conflicts. This can get very sticky, and it needs to be given
more thought.
A few final words about the growing militarization of
Mexican society and the increasing politicization of the
military. For over half a century, the Mexican armed forces have
avoided meddling in political affairs. They accept the principle
of subordination to civilian authority; they do not launch golpes
de estado. This being said, however, it would be a mistake to
take them for granted. Major changes are occurring in Mexican
society and in the military's role within it. Changes in roles
and circumstances could very well lead to new forms of behavior.
Let there be no question about it, this is a highly secretive,
authoritarian institution. While it is easy to bring it into the
political arena, it may be much harder to get it out.
This does not mean that a coup is just around the corner.
The likelihood that the military might overthrow the government
still seems fairly remote. Given the Latin American tradition,
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however, it is not unthinkable. Recent years have witnessed
growing military discontent with the country's civilian
leadership.75 If Mexico were to descend into chaos, the armed
forces might feel duty bound to intervene in order to "save the
nation." More likely, in the case of a weakened presidency, they
might become the power behind the throne. And that, in turn,
could lead to an increasingly partisan involvement. If the
government brought the military into the political arena and then
found itself seriously challenged by the political opposition,
the generals would have to decide whom to support. If they were
indebted to the regime, that might shift them away from the more
neutral stance the institution has adopted in recent years.76
Along these same lines, there is also a possibility that the
military could splinter and plunge into factional strife.
Political fissures within the institution are growing. In
January, for instance, 11 high-ranking retired military officers
(including 3 brigadier generals, an admiral and 3 vice-admirals)
announced their affiliation with the Party of Democratic
Revolution. Their defection led General Ramon Mota Sanchez, a
former PRI federal deputy (currently, there are 3 generals
serving as PRI deputies), to denounce them. In turn, retired BG
Gustavo Antonio Landeros responded: "I am not a traitor to the
military. I'm a traitor to intimidation and abuse." He claimed
that the military was tired of being used to "cover up" the
inability of the government to deal with the country's social
problems. At the same time, BG Samuel Lara decried the
privatization and sale of former state enterprises to
transnational corporations and the loss of national sovereignty
in the name of neoliberal economic policies.77
Nor is this discontent restricted to general officers. There
is considerable unhappiness in the mid-level officer corps with
the way the country is being run. A lot of lieutenant colonels
are disgusted with the corruption and incom-petence they see,
both among civilians and within the military itself. They, no
less than most Mexicans, are angry about the economic hardship
that they and their families have suffered in recent years, and
they are frustrated with a promotion system which, as they see
it, is designed to weed out the best elements in their ranks and
coopt the opportunists.
The United States and Mexico: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.
In February 1997, General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, the
director of the National Institute to Combat Drugs, was arrested
and forced to resign after it was learned that he had been on the
payroll of Amado Carrillo Fuentes' Juarez Cartel. At an
unprecedented news conference, Defense Minister Cervantes
announced that, for years, Gutierrez had received gifts,
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payments, and real estate from cartel leaders and provided
protection for their cocaine shipments.78 The general, it
appeared, had been able to camouflage his ties to Carrillo
Fuentes by launching operations against rival drug organizations
even as he consolidated his relationship with Mexico's "Lord of
the Skies." (A sobriquet Carrillo had won for pioneering the use
of Boeing 727s to transport huge shipments of cocaine from
Colombia to Mexico.)
This was a traumatic revelation. Since Gutierrez'
appointment as Mexico's drug czar in December, U.S. authorities
had embraced him without reservation. His North American
counterpart, retired General Barry McCaffrey, had gone out of his
way to praise him as "a serious soldier, a guy of absolute
unquestioned integrity." Only a week before his arrest, Gutierrez
had travelled to Washington, DC, where he had received a detailed
briefing full of sensitive information on U.S. narcotics
strategies, priorities, and operations. Even after discovering
his criminal connections, the Mexican government had kept the
Clinton administration in the dark for almost 2 weeks before
finally announcing his removal. At that point, U.S. authorities
found themselves having to scramble frantically to contain the
damage.79
The problem went far beyond the serious intelligence
failures that had occurred on both sides, and the operations and
informants that might have been compromised. The Gutierrez affair
triggered a massive crisis of confidence in the United States.
Together with a crescendo of public allegations about the narcoconnections of the Salinas family, two sitting state governors,
and other public officials, the Gutierrez revelations left the
devastating impression that the drug lords had so penetrated the
Mexican state that efforts to cooperate with the Mexican
government (on counternarcotics issues, at least) were futile.
There was simply no way of telling the good guys from the bad.
The Mexicans themselves apparently did not know, or did not want
to know.
The truth was that U.S. authorities and President Zedillo
had the same basic problem: They were both utterly clueless. For
years, the United States had placed its faith in Carlos Salinas
and the new technocratic generation, only to find out belatedly
that the tecnicos were plagued by the same corruption and
incompetence as the old guard politicos. By the same token,
Zedillo, though personally honest, was dependent on those around
him. He had trusted his advisers to find a prosecutor who would
solve the sensational assassination cases that had plagued the
country in recent years, and they had given him Pablo Chapa
Bezanilla. (In December 1996, Chapa was dismissed after
thoroughly bungling the Colosio and Ruiz Massieu murder cases.
Subsequently, he went into hiding after being accused of planting
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evidence--a dead body--on one of Raul Salinas' ranches. In May,
he was arrested in Madrid.) The Gutierrez fiasco was merely the
latest manifestation of the same disease. Whom could you trust?
This being said, the bottom line is that the United States
and Mexico are trapped. Their geographic proximation and growing
demographic, socio-economic, and political intermixture are such
that they cannot escape one another. Consequently, they must
learn to live together as best they can. For its part, Mexico
finds itself between a rock and a hard place: It can bring the
military into the law enforcement business, presumably on a
temporary basis, until crime can be curbed and the police
reformed. Or it can try to muddle through with the police and
judicial structures it already has, while moving more gradually
to purge them of incompetent, corrupt, and violent elements and
build more professional institutions.
Neither is a particularly good option. The dangers of
militarization are considerable. As Eric Olson has pointed out,
"replacing one unaccountable institution (the police) with
another that is equally impervious to public view, but
significantly more powerful (the military)," could be a
prescription for disaster.80 Nor is there any guarantee that the
armed forces will be more effective at combating crime than are
the police. Indeed, militarization has already created new
conflicts and morale problems within the law enforcement
community, as police insecurity and resentment have grown under
the spectre of displacement.81
On the other hand, criminal justice reform is an enormous
task. It involves much more than just changing the police; there
must be judicial reform also. Mexican circuit court magistrates
estimate that the narcos have corrupted about 30 percent of the
criminal court bench. This, along with widespread incompetence
among public prosecutors, means that the vast majority of
criminal cases against traffickers are flawed from the
beginning.82 Unless police reform is accompanied by a
thoroughgoing judicial reform, justice will remain an illusion.
Officers will continue to mete out their own forms of punishment
in the back rooms of police stations or in the streets.
Moreover, it is not enough to simply abolish or purge
corrupted institutions. Extensive training is necessary. (Police
trainers generally agree that cadets require at least a year's
training to develop professionalism.)83 Even if the United States
and the international community were willing to provide such
assistance--and the kinds of aid Mexico would accept would
probably be limited by nationalistic sensitivities--corruption is
so deeply engrained that it would be very difficult to eradicate.
The transformation of a political culture is never easy, and the
task is made even more difficult by the magnitude of the problem
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and the scarcity of resources. It is one thing to undertake
criminal justice reform in a tiny country like El Salvador or
Haiti, quite another in a country of 100 million people. Unless
Mexican officials are paid well enough so they can live decent
lives without resort to graft, any attempt at reform will be
doomed. Yet, even if salaries can be substantially raised, there
will always be those who will be tempted by opportunities for
enrichment.
There are no easy solutions. Indeed, it is a measure of the
intractable nature of the problem that Zedillo has opted for a
strategy of militarization. This is, in effect, an act of
desperation. Perhaps it will work. In the past, however, there
has been a tendency to treat militarization as a substitute for
serious police and judicial reform.84 Unless that changes,
militarization, with all its risks and costs, could become a
permanent feature of the Mexican political landscape--or at least
a chronic resort when civilian institutions fail.
Final Comments.
The United States needs to take into account the above
considerations in formulating its policy toward Mexico. In the
past, Washington has all too often been willing to overlook
unpleasant features of the Mexican political system--whether
human rights violations, corruption, narcotrafficking, or a lack
of democracy--when they were inconvenient to higher-priority
goals such as the containment of communism or the promotion of
NAFTA. Clearly, there is a danger in encouraging--or uncritically
supporting--military solutions to Mexico's problems. As difficult
as the task may be, the only strategy likely to offer long-term
answers to Mexico's multiple crises is one which fosters the
development of honest, competent, and responsible civilian
institutions.
With this in mind, the United States should make a special
effort to support criminal justice reform in Mexico. This means
providing and encouraging other countries to provide large-scale,
long-term aid to train civilian police and judicial personnel so
that these institutions can be developed in a manner conducive to
maintaining the rule of law. At the same time, Washington should
encourage the Mexican government to gradually reverse its policy
of militarization and recivilianize the police. While this cannot
be done overnight, the process can be begun within the reasonably
near future--providing sufficient resources and effort are put
into police reform. Meanwhile, in private, the United States
should speak out more forcefully on human rights abuses, narcocorruption and electoral irregularities when they occur. Good
relations with the Mexican government should not be purchased at
the expense of the Mexican people. Among other things, we should
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insist on adequate end-use monitoring of U.S. counternarcotics
aid to make sure that it is not used for unintended purposes.
One other note seems in order. The United States has a
tendency to blame others for problems that are in significant
part its own making. It is easier to chastise Mexico for
narcotrafficking than to solve the seemingly insatiable U.S.
appetite for drugs. Yet, without demand there would be no problem
of supply. In a very real sense, the United States has been
responsible for the destabilization of Mexico. Not wholly, of
course; Mexicans must accept their share of the responsibility
also. But the narco-pathology that is destroying their social and
political fabric is merely following its natural source of
attraction--the U.S. market. Indeed, by intensifying its
counternarcotics efforts in the Caribbean in the 1980s and early
1990s, the United States pushed much of the drug traffic
westward into Mexico. Subsequently, the North American Free Trade
Agreement compounded the problem by vastly expanding the crossborder movement of vehicles, making interdiction more difficult
and opening up new opportunities for smuggling (drugs and illegal
immigrants northward, arms southward). A related consequence has
been that the U.S. failure to curtail gunrunning to Mexico has
assured that violence-prone groups have not lacked the means of
carrying out their subversive activities.
What this implies in policy terms is that the United States
must clean up its own house. Without a much more intense and
sustained effort to curtail the U.S. domestic drug problem
through prevention, treatment, and law enforcement programs,
little of lasting consequence will be accomplished. Drug lords
and cartels will come and go, but the basic problem will continue
essentially unchanged.85
This is not the place for a detailed analysis of supply and
demand strategies. It is important to note, however, that there
is a growing consensus that treatment and education are the most
cost-effective ways to reduce drug consumption. A 1994 RAND
study, for instance, found that $34 million invested in treatment
reduces cocaine use as much as $366 million invested in
interdiction or $783 million in source-country programs. This
suggests rather strongly where U.S. priorities should lie.
The RAND report also concluded that treatment is 7.3 times
more cost-effective than domestic law enforcement in reducing
cocaine consumption.86 Still, it is a bit much to expect the
Mexicans to go after their cartels unless we are willing to do
the same. For all the attention that has been paid to the Mexican
traffickers by Congress and the press, little has been said about
their U.S. counterparts. If the United States wants Mexico to
more vigorously combat the cartels, it will have to do its share
too. While we are at it, we should also adopt much stronger
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measures against arms trafficking.87
Beyond this, we must also understand that narcotrafficking
will never be entirely eliminated. The drug war metaphor is
misleading: This is not a military campaign, but rather a law
enforcement, educational, and public health problem. As such, it
is a permanent, not a temporary, condition. The issue is not
about "winning" or "losing," but rather "reducing" and
"containing." (Or, alternatively, allowing the situation to get
completely out of control.) As long as we persist in thinking of
the problem in absolute terms, we will consign ourselves to
frustration, demoralization, and "defeat."
Finally, there is the issue of how to deal with Mexico. A
few months ago, the United States went through its annual rite of
"certification." This year the decision was more difficult than
previously because it came so close on the heels of the Gutierrez
Rebollo affair. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration, after
intense deliberation, chose to certify Mexico as a reliable ally
in the campaign against drug trafficking.
In the judgement of this writer, that decision was a
mistake. Not only is the veracity of the certification highly
questionable, but it sends precisely the wrong message: The
Mexicans are being told, in effect, that the United States is not
all that serious about drug trafficking. Certification is merely
a charade; Mexico has imunity. Consequently, the incentive to
cooperate will be blunted since there are no penalties for
noncooperation. The history of U.S.-Mexican counternarcotics
relations is replete with cynicism, evasion, manipulation, and
deceit, and certification will likely reinforce those
tendencies.88 Indeed, even as the Clinton administration was
making its decision, Mexican authorities were withholding
information that senior officials in the Attorney General's
office had allowed Humberto Garcia Abrego, the Gulf of Mexico
Cartel's chief money-launderer, to escape police custody. (That
revelation was made only a few hours after U.S. officials
proclaimed Mexico certified.89)
Again, there are no easy answers. The United States, too, is
caught between a rock and a hard place. Full decertification,
including the imposition of economic sanctions, would have
produced an intense nationalistic backlash in Mexico, and made it
much more difficult, if not impossible, for President Zedillo to
cooperate on counternarcotics issues. It would have struck a
telling body blow to Mexico's economic recovery, undermined the
country's political stability, and done lasting damage to U.S.Mexican relations, including trade, immigration, and
environmental cooperation. This was not a decision to be made
lightly or in the heat of anger.

23

The most obvious alternative would have been to decertify
Mexico, but waive economic sanctions for national security
reasons. Such a decision would have fully satisfied no one.
Mexican nationalists would still have been outraged. But while
the damage to U.S.-Mexican relations would have been
considerable, the worst consequences of the other two options
might have been either avoided or significantly lessened. And at
least the right message would have been sent.
There is, however, a fourth option: Congress could abolish
the certification process altogether. Put simply, the requirement
has become more trouble than it is worth. In an era in which the
United States is trying to promote broad hemispheric cooperation
with regard to trade, investment, counternarcotics, immigration,
democratization, environmental protection, and other matters,
certification is becoming a serious impediment to the promotion
of U.S. interests. Latin Americans consider it offensive--a
hypocritical attempt to publicly humiliate them and interfere in
their domestic affairs. Again, the United States also has a
problem with organized crime; we are not as free from sin as we
pretend. The Latins see Washington politicizing the process,
certifying some countries (Mexico) but not others (Colombia) for
reasons that appear to have little to do with their respective
performances. And they wonder, given the growing U.S. propensity
to resort to such sanctions, who will be next.
In short, decertification has become counterproductive. It
may well lead to less Latin American cooperation rather than
more. It undermines our allies by increasing nationalistic
pressures on them not to cooperate, even as it demoralizes them
by publicly rejecting the efforts they do make, sometimes at
considerable risk and cost to themselves. At the same time, the
vigorous application of sanctions (which is, granted, unlikely)
would damage legitimate businesses, hurt innocent people, and
produce a bitter anti-U.S. backlash that could spread throughout
the region. Under these circumstances, the United States would be
best advised to be less heavy-handed. There are other, more
effective ways to foster cooperation than mounting a soap box.
None of this should be taken to mean that the United States
should not exercise political and economic pressure, when
necessary, to promote its interests. On the contrary, Washington
should be more aggressive in pressing the Mexican government on
issues of democracy, human rights, corruption, and drug
trafficking. But there are right ways and wrong ways to do this.
One of the dangers is that current or future U.S. administrations
will again lapse into silence out of fear that raising such
issues will impede the attainment of higher priority objectives
(e.g., trade and investment). Congress originally required
certification, after all, because it felt the need to force a
reluctant Executive's hand on these matters.
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With regard to U.S.-Mexican military relations, a word of
caution is advisable. There have already been significant
improvements, and these can be built upon. But there is no
pressing need for a major expansion of military-to-military
contacts. The Mexicans are unlikely to accept the kinds of
activities we would find most attractive--they will not allow the
stationing of U.S. military units in the country, for instance-and there are risks and costs in pushing too hard. The uproar
over Secretary Perry's remarks is a case in point. While we may
well be able to increase cooperation in relatively
noncontroversial areas (e.g., humanitarian operations, improved
communications), this is fairly marginal stuff. Care will always
have to be taken to package these activities in ways that will be
acceptable to Mexico's politicians and public. Otherwise, further
embarrassments will occur. As for military aid, it is extremely
important that materials delivered be used for the purposes
intended. What we do not want, above all, is that U.S. weaponry
become identified with political repression or human rights
abuses.
As for U.S.-Mexican relations in general, I see rough times
ahead. There is already a lot of frustration and anger on both
sides of the border. While the United States and Mexico are
closer today than they have ever been before, closeness does not
necessarily translate into harmony. The major causes of strain in
the relationship are deeply rooted and are not likely to
disappear any time soon. Indeed, they may grow worse--in part
precisely because of the growing interpenetration and
interdependence of the two countries.
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